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Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, the
Secretary-General of the Democratic Party In 1941, the Allies invaded Iran
in a 'bridge of victory" operation that |
ation, but in Desember of the same year
the imperial army with the help
of the Western forces entered the city, and the killing and arrests that
followed were as cruel
as they were indiscriminate. The Republic had fallen; its President, Qazi
Mohammad, and
his close followers were taken prisoner, and then put to death on 30 March 1947.
Little by little the Kurdish people
re-gathered their strength. The Republic of Mahabad may
have been short-lived but in the collective memory it did not die. Running
unlimited risks,
the Kurdish leaders set about the vast task of protecting, educating and
organising the
population. Back from Europe in 1952, Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou devoted his
energies to
these clandestine activities for several years. In the next decade, he split his
time between
Europe and Kurdistan working in double harness: his university career and his
repeated
missions to Kurdistan.
In 1959, the regional context appeared
to be more hopeful; in neighbouring Iraq, the
monarchy had been overthrown, and Molla Mostafa Barzani (leader of the
Democratic Party
of Iraqi Kurdistan) had returned to his country after eleven years of exile in
former USSR.
The government in Baghdad accepted the principle of autonomy for the Kurdish
population
of Iraq.
On the other side of the frontier, the
PDKI steeled itself to renew the struggle. In 1968-69,
the armed conflict was rife in Iranian Kurdistan and the period ended in a bath
of blood with
the massacre of the Kurdish leaders - and yet, even then, Kurdish resistance
managed to raise
its head again.The vice-like grip in which the Shah's armies were trying to hold
it had to be
broken. At the third Congress of the PDKI (1973), Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou was
elected
Secretary-general and at those that followed he was invariably returned to
office.
During the years that followed,
the prestige of the Pahlavi monarchy continued to wane.
The White Revolution was questioned by experts in international affairs; the
greedy
demands and extravagant behaviour of the court were criticised in the press, and
the SAVAK
was active throughout the country with no social class being spared its baneful
attentions.
Clearly, the regime was doomed. If that happened, what should be the
position of PDKI ? In
view of the complex nature of the problems in the region that position had to be
clear-cut.
The Party had to reply unambiguously to a number of questions about its
identity, its
allegiances, its aspirations and its options. Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou and his
aides drew
up as coherent and realistic a programme as they could which may be summarised,
in
essence, as follows :
- We are Kurds, we belong to a people
that the vicissitudes of history have scattered over five
states. A bond of brotherhood binds us, and will continue to bind us, to all
other Kurds,
wherever they live.
- We are the descendants of one of the oldest Indo-European civilisations. Our
identity is
defined by the fact that we have our own language and our own culture.
- We are the citizens of a country called Iran - on the same basis of the other
peoples living
on the Iranian territory : the Baluchs, Persians, Azeris, Arabs, Turkmens and so
on.
- We are ardent defenders of the Declaration of Human Rights and the right of
peoples as
defined by the United Nations.
- We are for the freedom of worship and we respect all religions practiced by
our co-citizens.
Faith is an inviolable right. However, being resolutely modern in our outlook,
we feel that a
separation between the religious institutions and the state is desirable. A lay
state is not, on
that account, opposed to the faith or to those that serve it.
- For the living conditions of all to be improved, and customs from long ages
past
condemning women to a state of inferiority to be ended.
- To accelerate development in our country, it is necessary to establish a
system providing
free education of uniform quality throughout the country. A special effort
should be made in
the peripheral areas (Kurdistan, for example) that are clearly a long way
behind.
- No attempt to leave poverty behind will succeed without the active
participation of the
people themselves. To feel concerned - so we believe - they have to feel free.
Freedom of
movement for goods and persons, freedom of association and freedom to form
political
parties or unions and to belong to such organisations are the indispensable
preconditions for
economic and cultural development. - For there to be trust between the
population and the
central authority, large-scale decentralisation is necessary.
- In Kurdistan's case, that decentralisation has to comprise a charter of
autonomy for the
region whose boundaries would need to be precisely defined. Within this Kurdish
space, the
administrative languages should be Kurdish and Farsi, which would both be
official
languages of the regional and local authorities. Primary education should be in
Kurdish
whereas the two official languages should be routine practice in secondary
school. Lastly,
after so many years of violence, the Kurdish people could not accept a police
force that was
not manned by Kurds. It is only on these conditions that there would be any
chance of lasting
peace in Iranian Kurdistan.
- Lastly, the "kurdification" of the administrative and 'production
structures would demand
major investment in the training of senior officials and staff and also - it
goes without saying
- a multidisciplinary university on Kurdish land.
In other words, what the leaders of the PDKI demand is genuine and effective
autonomy.
Unfortunately, as everyone knows, dictatorships hide behind pyramid-shape
structures
excluding all horizontal communication. Feeling themselves perpetually
threatened (as
indeed they are), they seek the support of foreign powers which, in the end,
become their
masters. Dictators are not free and they abuse the freedom of others. So the
autonomy of
Iranian Kurdistan would be utopian unless Iran made the change to democracy.
Without
democracy in Iran there could be no guarantee for autonomy in Kurdistan.
Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou saw that these two concepts were inseparable and so they
became the watchword of the PDKI: Democracy for Iran, autonomy for Kurdistan.
This policy statement in which
chauvinism and sectarianism had no part won the PDKI the
firm friendship of Third World countries and modern democracies alike. During
his many
trips abroad, Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou was always sure of a warm welcome. Many
humanitarian organisations offered him help, eminent figures on the world stage
in political
and university life thought highly of him and human rights and religions
militants
encouraged him throughout his life. It was thanks to him that the Iranian Kurds
were able to
emerge from their isolation and make their voice heard in the international
fora. Some of
these sympathisers were surprised that the Iranian Kurds had "such
modest" demands after
such a bitter struggle. "It is really autonomy you want - nothing
more ?" was a not
uncommon reaction.
No secret clause was ever planned or
hidden in this blueprint for autonomy because it was
the fruit of long and profound thought about the world political context
following World
War Il. The Kurdish leaders took the view that major changes to frontiers were
ruled out and
that the general trend was towards the formation of large groupings rather that
the
fragmentation of existing units. In any case, once peace was restored, it would
surely be
natural for countries with common borders to seek to develop trade and cultural
exchange.
Therefore, in the long term, the existence of big Kurdish communities in
various parts of the
Middle East could be a positive factor in inter-regional relations. Everyone
would stand to
gain. It is well known that the big exporting countries pay considerable
attention to the
ethnic minorities, which often act as bridgeheads or relay stations in campaigns
to win a
foothold in new markets.
In short, the Kurdish thinkers concluded
that only the short-sighted could see ethnic,
linguistic or religious diversity as an obstacle to development. In the future
the big
middle-eastern house would derive its energy from the many different elements of
which it
was built. This pattern was particularly true of Iran itself with its 45 million
inhabitants of
which only 40 % were of Persian origin. (Today Iran has over sixty million
inhabitants). At
that time, towards 1975, this type of thinking sounded at least advanced, not to
say fanciful.
The Kurds were still under the heel of the Shah, but nothing is eternal,
dictators included.
One day in February 1979 Mohammed Reza
Pahlavi finally gave up the throne. At that time
the PDKI had a solid base and a real impact in Iranian Kurdistan. However, to
run the
territory properly and control its administration the police had to be removed
and the army
thrown out down to the very last man. This was the task of the
"peshmergas" or partisans,
who attacked army barracks and seized large stocks of arms and ammunition.
Abdul
Rahman Ghassemlou was then able to claim that, in a large part of Kurdistan, the
Kurds
were their own masters.
It was reasonable to hope that the
Iranian revolution would have brought men to power able
to realise that the interests of the central authority and those of the Kurds
were compatible.
Elections were planned and a new constitution was being written for the country.
Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou was
elected to the Assembly of experts and made ready to carry
to the capital the message of the Kurds - a simple message: there is room for
all in this
country where everything needs doing or re-doing. Imam Khomeini,
unfortunately, saw
things differently, he labelled the newly elected representative of the Kurds an
"enemy of
God" and declared a "holy war" on Kurdistan. This was in 1979.
Sudden though it was, this
call to arms was, in retrospect, not surprising. How, after all, could this grim
gerontocrat
with the cruelty of another age be prepared to give his attention to the history
and wants of
the Kurds ? How could Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou be expected to stay silent at the
hostage-taking, occupation of foreign embassies and other terrorist activities
launched in
1979 by an Imam who had recently returned from Neauphle-le-Château to sow the
seeds of
hate and insanity.
The Gulf War broke out the following
September. Perhaps these unsubdued Kurds would be
forgotten during this conflict between Iran and Iraq (1980-88). On the contrary,
in fact, it
cost them dearly, for their villages lay on either side of the frontier where
the fighting was at
its fiercest. They were accused, too, of being anti-patriotic : their
settlements were destroyed
and the people living there reduced to a wandering existence. The ultimate
purpose of these
crimes against humanity was obvious : to use the war as an excuse for
exterminating a
people whose authenticity was denied as strongly as it was proclaimed by the
Kurds.
Iran came out of the war with Iraq
exhausted and the Imam at death's door. The facts had to
be faced and Tehran had to find a compromise in Kurdistan. For his part,
Abdul Rahman
Ghassemlou had been saying for years that the fighting had been imposed on him,
that
neither side would ever lose or win and that, sooner or later, the Kurdish
problem would
have to be solved across the negotiating table. After flying a few kites, Tehran
issued a
concrete proposal for a meeting in Vienna on 28 Desember 1988 and the PDKI
accepted.
The talks lasted two days, 28 and 30 Desember and the results must have been
promising
because it was agreed to hold another meeting the following January. On 20
January, at the
end of the first round of negotiations, the representatives of Tehran were fully
acquainted
with the Kurdish demands. The principle of autonomy seemed to have been agreed.
The
details of how it was to be put into effect had yet to be defined.
Six months later, Abdul Rahman
Ghassemlou returned to Europe to attend a congress of the
Socialist International. Tehran tried to contact him again in order, he was
told, to pursue the
negotiations that had begun the previous winter. The PDKI accepted the offer
sent to it. The
meeting took place on 12 July 1989 in Vienna. The Tehran delegation was as
before,
namely Mohammed Jafar Sahraroudi and Hadji Moustafawi, except that this time
there was
also a third member : Amir Mansur Bozorgian whose function was that of
bodyguard. The
Kurds also had a three-man delegation : Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, his aide
Abdullah
Ghaderi-Azar (member of the PDKI Central Committee) and Fadhil Rassoul, an Iraqi
university professor who had acted as a mediator.
The next day, 13 July 1989, in the very
room where the negotiation took place Abdul
Rahman Ghassemlou was killed by three bullets fired at very close range. His
assistant
Abdullah Ghaderi-Azar was hit by eleven bullets and Fadhil Rassoul by five.
Hadji
Moustafawi succeeded in escaping. Mohammad Jafar Sahraroudi received minor
injuries
and was taken to hospital, questioned and allowed to go. Amir Mansur Bozorgian
was
released after 24 hours in police custody and took refuge in the Iranian
Embassy.
Indignation was at its height.
How, in this age, in the heart of Europe, could it happen for
the representatives of a member country of the United Nations to open fire at
point blank
range on the representatives of a country with whom it was at war and had
entered into peace
negotiations?
On 19 July two representatives of the political bureau of PDKI came to Paris to
attend the
funeral. At a press conference they announced, among other things, that the
higher
authorities of the PDKI had appointed Sadegh Charafkandi to perform the duties
of
Secretary-general. Sadegh Sharafkandi (who was also assassinated on 17
September 1992
by the Iranian terrorists) was in his fifties and had a doctorate in industrial
chemistry from
Paris University. He was Deputy Secretary-general of the Party up to the death
of Abdul
Rahman Ghassemlou .
The two murdered men of the PDKI were
buried on 20 July in Paris in the presence of a
throng of some two thousand people from all parts : Kurds and Armenians, Azeris
and
Turks, Persians and Europeans, poets and doctors, ministers and workpeople,
representatives
of humanitarian organisations and members of parliament. Leading the funeral
procession,
the peshmergas in their Kurdish resistance fighters' uniform advanced with
difficulty in the
torrid heat of the Parisian summer. They were all there, all that had been able
to travel on
their crutches and in their wheelchairs, having come from the various capitals
of Europe
where they were recovering, as best they could, from the wounds received in the
conflict.
Tehran denied all connection with this triple murder and told Austria to look
for clues in
other directions than Iran. But the findings of the ballistics experts were
conclusive.
In late November 1989 the Austrian
courts issued a warrant for the arrest of the three
Iranian representatives and the Austrian Government expressly accused the
Iranian
Government as having instigated the attack on Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou and the
two
other Kurds.
Thus died this man who was no warmonger
but a man of letters, master of several languages
and persuasive speaker. Overflowing with enthusiasm and energy, he was an
intellectual of
his time, this end of the twentieth century when the triumph of democracy seems
really
within reach.